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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature ofthe Case. 
This is an appeal from the February 2,2009, trial court's order denying the Appellants' 
(Brattons) Motion for New Trial. The trial commenced on September 3, 2008, and the final 
verdict was in favor of the Brattons and was rendered on September 16, 2008. Thereafter, 
Brattons moved for costs as a matter of right. The Scotts moved for JNOV, which, on 
November 17, 2008, was granted. The Brattons subsequently moved for a new trial, which 
motion was denied. The Scotts then moved for costs as a matter of right, discretionary costs, and 
attorney fees, which all were granted in substantial part. 
The underlying claim in this matter dealt with the destruction OfBrattons' 34-year-old 
irrigation ditch created by an express irrigation easement. Along with acreage, an 
easementlright-of-Way was conveyed to the Brattons by Harold and Janet Ford (Ford) in the 
early spring of 1973, and because ofthe muddy condition of the servient property, the ditch 
could not be dug until after the conveyance. As soon as the ground conditions pennitted, Ford 
dug a three-foot-wide irrigation ditch and verbally allowed for a pennanent 12-foot 
easementlright-of-Way. Brattons added a culvert at either end, as well as cement and galvanized 
pipe to the ditch to preclude erosion. The Brattons used and maintained the ditch and right-of-
way continually from 1973 to April Of2007. 
In April 2007, the new owners ofthe servient estate, John and Jackie Scott (Scotts), 
began interfering with the Brattons' use of their irrigation ditch. The Scotts were hostile to 
Mr. Bratton, told him not to spray or bum the easement, not to come onto their property to access 
1 Client:1500924.1 
the easement or ditch, also placed no trespassing signs around the easement and ditch/canal 
headgate, placed a perimeter rope fence containing "No Trespassing" signs, and destroyed the 
ditch and piping. 
The Brattons tried to negotiate with the Scotts and their attorney to have the Scotts stop 
their interference and replace the ditch. Unfortunately, those negotiations were unsuccessful. 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
On June 28, 2007, the Brattons filed a complaint for equitable and civil relief to have the 
ditch replaced. R. Vol. I, pp. 1-17. The Brattons' equitable relief claim was never heard due to 
the trial court's scheduling issues. The Brattons lost the irrigation season of 2007, and on 
January 14,2008, filed an Amended Complaint. R. Vol. I, pp. 94-110. The trial date was set, 
but vacated on two difference occasions at the request of the Scotts. Tr. Vol. I, p. 102, 1. 20 -
p. 103, 1. 20. A partial summary judgment was granted to the Brattons that provided a judgment 
affirming the Brattons' express irrigation easement. Tr. Vol. I, p. 61, L1. 11-15. The trial 
finally commenced on September 3, 2008. Tr. Vol. II, p. 292, L1. 1-10. At the time of the trial, 
upon motion of the Brattons, the trial court took judicial notice of Idaho Code Sections 42-1101, 
et seq. and 42-1201, et seq. Tr. Vol. II, p. 311,1. 2 - p. 312, 1. 18. 
On the eve of trial and over the Brattons' objection, the trial court ordered that the trial be 
trifurcated. Tr. Vol. I, p. 200, 1. 14 - p. 202, 1. 1. The first segment would deal with the 
scope/width of the irrigation easementlright-of-way; the second segment would decide liability; 
and the third segment would address damages. [d. The jury would be impaneled for ail three 
segments, but would be advisory only as to the first segment. [d., p. 249, 1. 24 - p. 250, 1. 3; 
2 Client:1500924.1 
p. 252, LL. 8-11. The trial court emphasized more than once that if the jury did not find for the 
Brattons on liability, then the damage segment would not be necessary. [d., p. 200, L. 14-
p. 202, L. 1. The jury would render three separate and distinct verdicts following each of the 
three segments. [d. 
In the first segment, the trial court, over objections and argument of the Brattons, 
instructed the jury strictly according to the three elements of implied easement as set out in 
Thomas v. Madsen, 142 Idaho 635, 638, 432 P.3d 392,395 (2006). Tr. Vol. II,p. 311, L. 2-
P. 312, L. 18. The Brattons argued that the jury should be instructed pursuant to Idaho Code 
Section 42-1102. Based on the Madsen instruction regarding implied easement, the jury found 
there was no "Madsen defined" implied easement. R. Vol. III, pp. 355-56. 
The second segment of the trial addressed liability. The jury unanimously found, in 
pertinent part, that: the Scotts interfered with the Brattons' easement; the Scotts' interference was 
a proximate cause of harm; the Scotts had changed the Brattons' ditch; and the Scotts did not 
have written permission to change the ditch. R. Vol. III, pp. 387-91; Tr. Vol. IV, p. 1416, LL. 7-
12; p. 1420, LL. 3-17. 
The third segment addressed damages. Immediately prior to the third segment, the trial 
court ruled that the Brattons could not address damage evidence including crop loss and the 
consequences thereof because the jury had found there was no diminished flow. Tr. Vol. IV, 
p. 1419, L. 4 -po 1420, L. 17. The Brattons' damage case had been prepared based upon Idaho 
Code Sections 42-1102 and 42-1207 in that the destruction of the ditch and interference of the 
3 Client:1500924.1 
Scotts had caused injury to the Brattons' property activities conducted thereon. Id., p. 1412, 
L. 23 -po 1415, L. 21; p. 1420, LL. 3-17. 
The Brattons claimed the cost of constructing an underground irrigation system that 
would essentially replace their 34-year-old system and allow avoidance of the ongoing 
interference by the Scotts. Tr. Vol. III, p. 608, L. 20 - p. 609, L. 5. The jury had found 
interference and that interference had caused harm to the Brattons. Id., p. 1396, LL. 1-18. The 
trial court excluded evidence of a piped ditch, as well as the crop loss and consequences thereto 
based on Idaho Code Section 42-1207. Tr. Vol. IV, p. 1412, L. 23 - p. 1415, L. 21; p. 1419, L. 4 
- p. 1420, L. 17. 
The trial court allowed the Brattons' irrigation expert to explain and illustrate 
replacement of a fully aboveground ditch. Tf. Vol. IV, p. 1453, L. 12 - p. 1454, L. 12. That was 
all the damage evidence allowed. Id. The jury verdict in the third segment was.in favor of the 
Brattons in the amount of $6,500.00. R. Vol. III, pp. 451-53. Following the third verdict, the 
Brattons filed a Motion for Costs, which was never heard. R. Vol. IV, pp. 563-67. The Scotts 
then moved for a JNOV, which was granted. R. Vol. III, pp. 454-55. The Brattons subsequently 
moved for a new trial, which was denied. R. Vol. IV, pp. 598c600; pp. 651-52. The Scotts filed 
a motion for costs as a matter of right, discretionary costs, and attorney fees, which was granted 
in substantial part. R. Vol. III, pp. 498-506; pp. 649-50. A Judgment was entered in favor of the 
Scotts. R. Vol. IV, pp. 551-53. The Brattons filed this timely appeal. R. Vol. IV, pp. 655-59. 
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C. Statement of Facts. 
In 1973, Ford owned and subsequently divided a tract ofland that became the Canyon 
County Fruitdale Farm Subdivision. Def. Tr. Ex. A; Tr. Vol. II, p. 414, L. 9 - p. 426, L. 8. In 
doing so, among other divisions, Ford created two adjoining lots, lots number 32 and 40. [d. On 
April 19, 1973, Ford conveyed 32 to the Brattons byway ofa Warranty Deed (dominant estate). 
[d. 
The Warranty Deed from Ford to the Brattons included a one-half share of water stock 
held in the Canyon Hill Ditch Company and another one-half share of stock held in Middleton 
Mill Ditch Company. [d. In addition, the Warranty Deed gave an express easement for the 
construction of a three-foot-wide irrigation ditch, maintenance, as well as rights of ingress and 
egress onto lot 40 (servient estate). [d. The ditch was constructed by Ford as soon as the spring-
time ground condition allowed use of a tractor and "V" illtcher. Tr. Vol. II, p. 427, LL. 2-15; 
p. 441, L. 20 - p. 447 L. 7. The deed reads in pertinent part: 
[Aln easement along the boundary line between Lots 39 and 40 of FRUITDALE 
FARM SUBDIVISION, Section 3, Township 4 North, Range 3 West, Boise 
Meridian, Canyon County, Idaho, 3 feet in width and of a length of approximately 
200 yards along said boundary line between Lots 39 and 40 for the construction 
and maintenance of an irrigation ditch and for ingress and egress along said ditch 
boundary line. 
Def. Tr. Ex. A; Tr. Vol. II, p. 425, L. 12 - p. 426, L. 2. 
In addition to the express deed, Ford orally and by conduct permanently enlarged the 
easement to 12 feet, which in 2008, Ford testified had been in place since 1973. Tr. Vol. II, 
p. 425, L. 12 - p. 427, L. 15; p. 459, L. 18 - p. 460, L. 24. 
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The three-foot-wide irrigation ditch traversed lot 40 and was specifically located far 
enough away from the fence constructed between lots 39 and 40. This placement ofthe ditch 
was to protect the integrity of the fence and to allow for installation and maintenance ofthe 
ditch. Tr. Vol. II, p. 427, LL. 2-15; p. 453, L1. 16-22. The easement allowed irrigation to the 
dominant estate, lot 32, which without the ditch would have been landlocked. Id., p. 456, 1. 21 -
p. 457, 1. 23. Because the servient property had a downward drop and westerly slope, the 
Brattons tiled sections of the irrigation ditch in concrete and galvanized pipe in order to prevent 
erosion and to also control water flow and volume. Id., p. 444, L1. 18-25; p. 445, 1. 13 - p. 447, 
1. 16. 
After the ditch was constructed, the Brattons began their irrigation and corresponding 
ditch maintenance. !d., p. 441, LL. 13-23; p. 454, L1. 19-23; p. 456, LL. 21- 24. Ford, upon 
agreement with the Brattons, also used the Brattons' ditch for irrigation of a portion of lot 40, the 
servient estate. Id., p. 422, L1. 11-19; p. 442, L1. 9-14. Since 1973 and up to 2007, the Brattons 
enjoyed the use of their ditch and maintained the ditch, depositing dredged spoils adjacent to the 
ditch. !d., p. 470, L1. 1-5; p. 478, 1. 22 - p. 479, L. 15. The Brattons' use and maintenance of 
the ditch and corresponding ditch easement involved use of a tractor with a "V" ditcher to clean 
the ditch and to deposit spoils along the ditch banks, the spraying and burning of weeds, and for 
ingress and egress for irrigation and ditch equipment. Id., p. 470, L1. 1-10. The maintenance, 
ingress, and egress required a 12-foot easement. Id., p. 425, 1. 12 - p. 426, 1. 8. 
On January 2, 1996, Ford signed a Quitclaim Deed for lot 40 (servient estate) to Lois 
Rawlinson (Rawlinson). After the 1996 Quitclaim Deed, the Brattons continued the use, 
6 CHent 1500924.1 
enjoyment, and maintenance of their irrigation ditch and its underlying easement. On 
September 13, 2005, Rawlinson gift-deeded lot 40 (servient easement) to the Scotts. PI. Trial 
Ex. 9; id., p. 462, L. 20 - p. 464, L. 1. This gift deed specifically stated, in pertinent part, that the 
Scotts take the property: 
together with all tenements, hereditaments, water, water rights, ditches, ditch 
rights, easements and appurtenances thereunto belonging or in anywise 
appertaining, and subject to any encumbrances or easements as appear of record 
or by use upon such property. 
[d. (emphasis added). 
In April 2007, Mr. Bratton followed his normal routine to prepare to receive water for the 
upcoming irrigation season, by spraying the ditch and easement for weeds. Tr. Vol. II, p. 455, 
LL. 9-18; Tr. Vol. III, p. 939, L. 17 - p. 940, L. 10. Once the weeds died, as was also his 
routine, Mr. Bratton accessed his easement and began to bum the dried weeds. [d., Tr. Vol. II, 
p. 455, L. 19 - p. 456, L. 11; Tr. Vol. III, id. During the burning process, the Scotts approached 
Mr. Bratton in a hostile manner and demanded that he stop burning, that he never again spray or 
bum the easement, and that he leave the servient property. Tr. Vol. III, p. 941, L. 8 - p. 942, 
L. 17; id., p. 943, LL. 12-21. During the trial, the Scotts agreed that they approached 
Mr. Bratton and told him not to bum or spray the irrigation ditch or the area adjacent thereto. 
!d., p. 863, L. 23 - p. 864, L. 11. 
Within days of the above encounter, the Scotts placed "No Trespassing" signs on the 
boundary line between lots 32 (dominant estate) and 40 (servient estate) at the point ofthe 
Brattons'ingress. Tr. Vol. III, p. 966, LL. 1-23. The Scotts also placed "No Trespassing" signs 
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near Brattons' canal headgate. [d. On a second encounter, the Scotts acted in a hostile manner 
to prevent Mr. Bratton from ingress of his easement. [d., p. 951, L. 16 - p. 952, L. 12. 
Mr. Bratton was just beginning to go onto his easement when Mr. Scott came running after him 
and shouting at Bratton. [d., p. 941, L. 11 - p. 942, L. 11. Mr. Bratton backed away from the 
easement and did not access water. [d.,p. 943, LL.12-21;p. 951, L.16-p. 952, L.12. Soon 
thereafter, when Mr. Bratton was away from his property, and without permission from the 
Brattons, the Scotts leveled the 34-year-old ditch, destroyed the galvanized pipe, and removed 
the cement piping. [d., p. 883, LL. 18-23; p. 953, L. 5 - p. 954, L. 1. After the ditch was 
destroyed, Mr. Bratton called the police and unsuccessfully attempted, via negotiations, to 
require the Scotts to replace the 34-year-old ditch, piping, and to stop interfering with the 
easement. [d., p. 947, LL. 5-7; p. 954, LL. 5-13. The Brattons also tried, without success, to 
mediate the issue through counsel. [d., p. 956, L 17 - p. 957, L. 12. 
The Brattons were without irrigation water during the 2007 and 2008 irrigation seasons 
because of the destruction oftheir ditch and because of repeated interference by the Scotts. !d., 
p. 996, LL. 9-24. 
II. ARGUMENT 
A. Standard of Review. 
This appeal addresses the trial court's grant of Scotts' motion for judgment n.o.v., as well 
as the trial court's denial of the Brattons' Motion for New Trial. On appeal of a motion for 
judgment n.o. v. and a motion for new trial, the appellate court applies distinct standards for each. 
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The standard of review for a judgment n.o.v. is a question of law and has been articulated by this 
Court: 
In detel1llining whether a directed verdict or judgment n.o.v. should have 
been granted, the appellate court applies the same standard as does the trial court 
which passed on the motion originally. 
Quickv. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 727P.2d 1187(1986). 
In contrast, the appellate standard of review for new trial addresses the question of 
whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion. This Court has set forth the 
review standard as follows: 
On appeal, we [the Supreme Court] will not reverse a trial court's order granting 
or denying a motion for new trial "unless the court has manifestly abused the wide 
discretion vested in it." [Citation omitted.] "While we [the Supreme Court] must 
review the evidence, we are not in a position to 'weigh' it as the trial court." 
Jones v. Panhandle Distribs., Inc., 117 Idaho 750, 792 P.2d 315 (1990). 
B. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion in Rnling in Favor of the Scotts' 
Motion for Judgment Not Withstanding the Verdict as to the Verdict for 
Damages. 
The Scotts' motion for judgment n.o.v. involved only the verdict in the third segment, 
damages. As stated, supra, the function ofI.R.C.P. 50(b) is "to give the trial court the last 
opportunity to order the judgment that the law reqnires." Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 764, 
727 P.2d 1187, 1192 (1986). In detel1llining whether a judgment not withstanding the verdict 
should have been granted, the Idaho Appellate Court applies "the same standard as does the trial 
court ..... " Quick, 111 Idaho at 763,727 P.2d at 1191. The question of whether a verdict 
should have been directed "is purely a question of law," and in such matters, the "parties are 
entitled to a full review by the appellate court without special deference to the views of the trial 
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court." ld. at 764. This court is obligated to review the record ofthe trial below and determine if 
there was "substantial evidence to justify submitting the case to the jury." ld. The question is 
"not whether there is literally no evidence supporting the party against whom the motion is 
made, but whether there is substantial evidence upon which the jury could properly find a verdict 
for that party." Quick, 111 Idaho at 773, citation omitted. 
1. Damage verdict. 
In moving for judgment not withstanding the verdict, the movant admits the truth of the 
adversary's evidence and every legitimate inference that could be drawn therefrom in the light 
most favorable to the non-moving party. See, e.g., id., Quick at 763, and Smith v. Big Lost River 
Irrigation Dist., 83 Idaho 374, 391 (1961). Therefore, the trial judge is not permitted to weigh 
the evidence or pass on the credibility of the witnesses and make his or her own separate findings 
of fact for comparison with those of the jury. ld., Quick at 763 (citation omitted, emphasis 
added). Moreover, the trial court should not take a case from the jury unless, as a matter oflaw, 
no recovery could be had upon any view which properly could be taken of the evidence. Smith, 
83 Idaho at 391, citing Stearns v. Graves, 62 Idaho 312 (1941). This is particularly true of 
motions implicating findings of proximate cause. Fouche v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 107 
Idaho 701, 704 (1984) (citation omitted, emphasis added). As is of record, the second verdict on 
proximate cause was a unanimous verdict, which allowed the trial to commence to the third 
segment on damages. The Brattons prevailed as to the verdict on damages. 
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2. Jury's common knowledge. 
In this matter, the jury was well versed in irrigation ditches and the costs associated. As 
the Idaho Supreme Court and the Idaho Court of Appeals have both confirmed, it is the very 
nature of the jury process for jurors to bring with them into the jury room their general life 
experiences, and a sense of what is .and is not reasonable in light of those experiences and in light 
of the facts before them. See Quick, III Idaho at 765; see also Smith v. Praegitzer, 113 Idaho 
887,890 (Ct. App. 1988). Consequently, when considering trial evidence and reaching a verdict, 
jurors are permitted and expected to take into account matters of common knowledge and 
experience. State v. Espinoza, 133 Idaho 618, 622 (Ct. App. 1999). In other words, in this 
matter, the members ofthis jury, when reaching a verdict, are permitted to apply their own 
experience and their own common knowledge. 
Damage awards, particularly damage awards in tort actions, are primarily a question for 
the jury. See Gonzales v. Hodson, 91 Idaho 330, 334 (1966); see also Bentzinger v. McMurtrey, 
100 Idaho 273, 274 (1979). 
This is because "[ d]amages are susceptible to proof only with an approximation of 
certainty . ... " See Shrum v. Wakimoto, 70 Idaho 252, 256 (1950) (citation omitted, emphasis 
added); see also Gonzales and Bentzinger, supra. As a result, it is solely for the jury to estimate 
damages as best they can by reasonable probabilities, and based upon their sound judgment as to 
what would be just and proper under all of the circumstances. Shrum, 70 Idaho at 256, quoting 
Gorton v. Doty, 57 Idaho 792 (1937). Jury verdicts are not to be disturbed absent a showing of 
bias or prejudice. Jd. (emphasis added). 
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In this matter, during voir dire, the trial court learned that the jury was very versed in 
water rights, ditches, pastures, hay, etc. Juror Number 540 had experience driving large 
equipment, digging ditches, and laying pipe; Juror Number 542 had experience with irrigation, 
driving large equipment, digging ditches, and laying pipe, experience with plants and weeds in 
Idaho, owned rural property, and owned horses; Juror Number 544 had experience driving large 
equipment and owned rural property; Juror Number 548 had experience driving large equipment 
and had owned horses; Juror Number 549 had experience with irrigation, pastures, and hay, 
owning acreage, driving large equipment, digging ditches and laying pipe, and owned horses and 
livestock; Juror Number 557 owned rural property; Juror Number 559 had experience driving 
large equipment and owned rural property; Juror Number 572 had experience driving large 
equipment, digging ditches, laying pipe, and owned rural property; and Juror Number 586 had 
experience driving large equipment, had been involved in property disputes, and owned rural 
acreage and horses. Based on the collective common experience of the jury, even though the 
trial court excluded the cost ofthe ditch and pipe replacement, this jury used that collection of 
common experience to arrive at a reasonable verdict based on what evidence the trial court did 
allow. 
3. The district court erred by not following law ofthe state ofIdaho as 
set forth by Idaho Code Sections 42-1101, et seq. and 42-1201, et seq. 
a. Notice pleading. 
Importantly, the IdahoRules of Civil Procedure establish a system of notice pleading. 
Under this system of pleading, a plaintiff does not need to include a great deal of particularity in 
a complaint. Rather, a plaintiff only needs to allege facts and claims sufficient for a defendant to 
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understand the claim that has been alleged against them. See Cookv. Skyline Corp.,·135 Idaho 
26, 34, 13 P.3d 857, 865 (2000). Discussing Idaho's notice pleading requirements, the court in 
Cook, supra, stated, "[nJotice pleading frees the parties from pleading particular issues or 
theories, and allows parties to get through the courthouse door by merely stating claims upon 
which relief can be granted." Id. 
More recently, this Court in Vendelin v. Costeo Wholesale Corp., 104 Idaho 416, 427,95 
P.3d 34, 45 (2004), stated: "With the advent of notice pleading, a party is no longer slavishly 
bound to stating particular theories in its pleadings. Rather, a complaint need only state claims 
upon which relief may be granted .... The emphasis ... is to insure that a just result is 
accomplished, rather than requiring strict adherence to rigid forms of pleading." (Emphasis 
added.) 
In this case, the Complaint and Amended Complaint set forth the facts that: (I) the 
Brattons' ditch had been a long-standing irrigation ditch that was open and obvious; (2) that the 
Scotts knew ofthe ditch; (3) that the ditch was unilaterally obliterated by the Scotts; (4) that the 
corresponding irrigation easement and right-of-way measured 12 feet wide; (5) that the Scotts 
were put on notice of the Brattons' ditch by their Gift Deed; (6) that the Scotts had observed 
Mr. Bratton using the ditch; atlP (7) that the Scotts repeatedly interfered with the Brattons' use of 
the ditch and its corresponding easement, which interference and ditch obliteration damaged the 
Brattons. Therefore, the Brattons satisfied the requirements of notice pleading. The Scotts and 
the trial court were well apprised of the claims to insure that a just result could be accomplished. 
Further, each of the enumerated facts were proven at trial during the first trial segment. 
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b. Idaho Code Title 42. 
In recognizing the importance that water and irrigation play in Idaho, the legislatnre has 
enacted specific legislation regarding irrigation and water rights. Various statutes set forth the 
applicable law in both the scope and governance of such rights. 
The Idaho Legislatnre recognized that a ditch owner must be permitted to clean, 
maintain, and repair a ditch or canal. 1 Idaho Code Section 42- I 102 expressly grants to an 
irrigation easement a right-of-way so that irrigation ditch owners can "properly do the work of 
cleaning, maintaining and repairing the ditch, canal or conduit with personnel and with such 
equipment as is commonly used, or reasonably adapted, to that work." Id. (emphasis added). 
Recognizing the importance of cleaning and maintaining a ditch, Idaho Code Section 42- I 102 
further states that a ditch owner is permitted sufficient width to properly effect the necessary 
cleaning, maintenance, or repairs. This section is set forth: 
1 Idaho law does not expressly define the term "ditch owner." However, Idaho case law 
implies that a ditch owner is an individual or entity with an interest in the water of a particular 
ditch or canal. Camp v. E. Fork Ditch Co., 137 Idaho 850, 857, 55 P.3d 304, 3 I 1 (2002) (citing 
Reynolds Irrigation Dist. v. Sproat, 69 Idaho 315, 206 P.2d 774 (1948)). As a ditch owner, an 
individual or entity is entitled to an easement across the land of others to transport its irrigation 
water. Ramseyer v. Jamerson, 78 Idaho 504, 511, 305 P.2d 1088, 1093 (1957). The Supreme 
Court of Idaho has provided that "[ilt is well established in this jurisdiction that an easement is 
the right to use the land of another for a specific purpose that is not inconsistent with the general 
use ofthe property by the owner." Abbott v. Nampa Sch. Dist. No. 131, 119 Idaho 544, 549-50, 
808 P.2d 1289, 1294-95 (1991) (citing Sinnett v. Werelus, 83 Idaho 514, 365 P.2d 952 (1961)). 
A ditch owner also has a "secondary easement with rights of ingress and egress for the purpose 
of maintenance ... and the regnlation of his water." Ramseyer, 78 Idaho at 511, 305 P.2d at 
1093. The "cleaning, maintaining, and repairing" of a canal or ditch to ensnre the proper 
transportation of water is considered within the scope of a maintenance easement. Nampa & 
Meridian Irrigation Dist. v. Wash. Fed. Sav., 135 Idaho 518, 20 P.3d 702 (2001); see also IDAHO 
CODE § 42-11 02. 
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The right of way shall include ... the right to ... occupy such width ofthe load 
along the banks of the ditch. .. as is necessary ... . 
IDAHO CODE § 42-1102. 
The statutory irrigation easement and right-of-way granted by Idaho Code 
Section 42-1102 is crucial (or, in the parlance of the statute itself, is "essentiaf') to water users 
given the express duties and liabilities that Idaho Code Title 42, Chapter 12 imposes upon those 
who own, construct, and/or control irrigation works. For example, Idaho Code Sections 42-1202 
and 42-1203 mandate maintenance of a ditch and ditch embankments for the delivery of water, 
particularly to prevent the "useless discharge and running away ofwater.".See IDAHO CODE 
§ 42-1203. Moreover, Idaho Code Section 42-1204 obligates ditch owners and constructors to 
operate and maintain their irrigation works in such a manner so as not to damage or injure the 
property or premises of others; the failure to properly do so resulting in liability for the ditch 
owner for the damage/harm caused to others. ld. See also IDAHO CODE § 42-1102. These 
statutorily imposed duties and liabilities are why the mere existence of a ditch gives rise to the 
equally necessary corresponding irrigation easement and right-of-way. See IDAHO CODE 
§ 42-1102 ("The existence of a visible ditch ... shall constitute notice to the ... servient estate, 
that the owner of the ditch ... has the right-of-way ... granted by this section."). Without such a 
corresponding irrigation easement or right-of-way, ditch owners would have no way of meeting 
the obligations or mitigating the liabilities imposed by Idaho Code Sections 42-1201 through 
42-1204. 
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Pursuant to Idaho Code Section 42-1102, an easement for an irrigation ditch allows for 
enough room on each side of the ditch to maintain the ditch, and allows for the ingress and 
egress of machinery or equipment customarily used or adapted for that maintenance. The 
evidence at trial proved that while the Brattons' ditch was itself was only three feet in width, the 
historic, usual, and customary maintenance of the ditch (via the use of a tractor and a ditcher) 
required at least 12 feet in total width from the bank ofthe ditch, so as not to harm a third party's 
boundary fence. The Brattons further proved that the servient estate owner at the time the ditch 
was constructed (Ford in 1973) granted the Brattons a 12-foot irrigation easement recognizing 
these maintenance needs. 
c; The trial court erroneously barred Idaho Cod~ Section 
42-1102. 
The trial court erroneously ruled that Idaho Code Section 42-1102 granted an irrigation 
easement or right-of-way only to those water users whose property was riparian (i.e., possessing 
frontage on a natural stream). However, the plain and unambiguous language ofIdaho Code 
Section 42-1102 makes clear that the statute provides a private right of eminent domain for 
irrigation purposes beyond those factual scenarios involving only riparian parcels abutting 
natural streams. Idaho Code Section 42-1102 provides, in pertinent part: 
When any such owners or claimants to land have not sufficient length of frontage 
on a stream to afford the requisite fall for a ditch ... on their own premises forthe 
proper irrigation thereof, !!I. where the land proposed to be irrigated is back from 
the banks of such stream, and convenient facilities otherwise for the watering of 
said lands cannot be had, such owners or claimants are entitled to a right-of-way 
through the lands of others, for the purposes of irrigation. 
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See IDAHO CODE § 42-1102 (emphasis added). Thus, Idaho Code Section 42-1102 applies to at 
least TWO different scenarios, as illustrated by the statute's use of the disjunctive term "or." The 
statute applies when: (1) riparian property owners lack sufficient stream frontage to afford the 
requisite fall for a ditch; OR (2) when the land proposed to be irrigated is back from the banks 
of such stream. The Brattons irrigate lands that are set back from the nearest natural stream 
serving as the source of their water rights (the Boise River in this instance). Consequently, the 
Brattons' parcel is not riparian. However, Idaho Code Section 42-1102 still grants the Brattons 
an irrigation easement and right-of-way as the owners ofland susceptible to irrigation, even 
though that land is "back from the banks" of the Boise River. 
Put bluntly, the trial court's holding that Idaho Code Section 42-1102 grants irrigation 
easements and rights-of-way only to riparian landowners is proven wrong by two simple 
observations: (1) Idaho common law abolished the riparian rights doctrine over a century ago 
(see, e.g., Hutchinson v. Watson Slough Ditch Co., 16 Idaho 484, 491 (1909»; and (2) hundreds 
of thousands of acres of ground in Idaho are irrigated within the boundaries of irrigation districts 
and canal companies whose lands are not riparian to the source (river) of water supplying the 
water rights used; a system of irrigation that would not exist if Idaho Code Section 42-1102 did 
not grant easement and right-of-ways for landlocked parcels of property. 
Moreover, and despite the trial court's ruling, the Brattons' interpretation ofIdaho Code 
Section 42-1102, and its application to the factual scenario presented in their Complaint, directly 
squares with Idaho Supreme Court authority interpreting the statute in the very same manner. 
See, e.g., Canyon View Irrigation Co. v. Twin Falls Canal Co., 101 Idaho 604, 607 (1980) ("In 
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order to assist owners of water rights whose lands are remote from the water source, the state 
has partially delegated its powers of eminent domain to private individuals ... [IDAHO CODE 
§§ 42-1102 and 42-1106] permit landlocked individuals to condenm a right-of-way through the 
lands of others for purposes of irrigation."). Id. (emphasis added).' 
d. Case law does not bar Idaho Code Section 42-1102. 
The trial court cited Nampa & Meridian Irrigation District v. Washington Federal 
Savings, 135 Idaho 518 (2001), as dispositive in this matter because it involved the interpretation 
and the application of an express written easement and its juxtaposition and competition with the 
provisions of Idaho Code Section 42-1102. However, this Court's decision in Washington 
Federal Savings was not predicated upon a general finding that a written express easement 
trumps the application ofIdaho Code Section 42-1102. Instead, this Court declined to apply the 
statute in the overly-expansive manner as argued by the Nampa and Meridian Irrigation District. 
In Washington Federal Savings, the Nampa and Meridian Irrigation District attempted to 
prohibit Washington Federal Bank's construction of a fence and a sidewalk within the easement 
2 In a perplexing tum of events later in the proceedings, the trial court subsequently 
decided that the Brattons' parcel was riparian due to its relationship with the artificial, man-
made irrigation ditch serving the property. Therefore, and according to the trial court, the 
Brattons' parcel was not "landlocked," and for that reason the Brattons could not avail 
themselves of the irrigation easementlright-of-way rights granted by Idaho Code 
Section 42-1102, and as confirmed in Canyon View Irrigation Co., supra. Needless to say, the 
Brattons' parcel is not riparian to the source of their water rights (the Boise River), or any other 
natural stream for that matter. Artificial irrigation works do not create riparian land. Instead, the 
mere existence of the Brattons' ditch, and the existence of the larger system of interconnected 
canals and ditches that deliver the Brattons' irrigation water to their ditch, demonstrates that the 
Brattons' parcel is not riparian. Said delivery canals and.ditches are necessary for water delivery 
to the Brattons' parcel because the parcel is landlocked and not susceptible to irrigation by any 
other means. 
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and right-of-way for the Finch Lateral. Nampa and Meridian Irrigation District argued, in part, 
that Idaho Code Section 42-1102 granted the district an exclusive irrigation easement from 
which it could exclude others, including underlying fee title land owners. Id. at 521. Rather than 
holding that the express channel change easement agreement at issue trumped the application of 
Idaho Code Section 42-1102 for purposes of defining the scope of the Finch Lateral easement, 
this Court read the express easement agreement in harmony with Idaho Code Section 42-1102, 
holding that both the irrigation district and the bank possessed rights under the statute. Id. This 
Court held that Idaho Code Section 42-1102 granted the Nampa and Meridian Irrigation District 
a non-exclusive irrigation easement for the Finch Lateral, and that the bank was correspondingly 
entitled to use its property in any manner that did not interfere with the purposes and scope of the 
subject irrigation easement. Id. 
In sum, this Court held that the irrigation district attempted to use Idaho Code 
Section 42-1102 in an impermissibly expansive manner, a manner that would have required the 
Court to find that the district's irrigation easement and right-of-way was exclusive, and that the 
statute op'erated to bar Washington Federal's fence and sidewalk for public safety reasons. 
Understandably, this Court was not willing to reach that result because the plain language of 
Idaho Code Section 42-1102 does not give rise to an "exclusive" irrigation easement or right-of-
way, nor does the statute expressly contemplate the prohibition of encroachments for "public 
safety" reasons. Id. at 523-24. Of importance to this case, however, is the fact that this Court 
did not hold, as did the trial court, that an express easement trumps, and therefore bars, the 
consideration and application ofIdaho Code Section 42-1102. 
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In the case at bar, the Brattons are seeking nothing more than the irrigation easement and 
right-of-way that was granted to them by the servient estate and further granted and confinned 
by Idaho Code Section 42-11 02. The Brattons are not claiming that their irrigation easement and 
right-of-way is exclusive, and they are not trying to expand the purposes for which the easement 
exists. Instead, the Brattons are merely seeking the same 12-foot irrigation easement and right-
of-way they have always had, which allows them to operate and maintain the ditch in the same 
reasonable and customary manner that they have done for over the last 34 years (namely, with a 
tractor and a V ditcher-equipmeht commonly used and reasonably adapted for those operation 
and maintenance purposes). 
The bottom line for consideration in this matter is that the Brattons' irrigation easement 
and right-of-way preexisted the Scotts' ownership of their property. The Scotts took ownership 
. of the servient property subject to that preexisting irrigation easement and right-of-way. While 
the Scotts are free to use their property in any manner that does not interfere with the purposes 
and scope for which the Brattons' irrigation easement and right-of-way was created, the Scotts 
absolutely may not interfere with the right, destroy the existing ditch, or otherwise act to rescind 
the dominant irrigation easement. 
The Brattons rightfully possess those rights expressly granted to them in 1973 by the 
servient property owner (Ford), and those concurrent rights and obligations granted and 
prescribed by Idaho Code Title 42, Chapters 11 and 12. Idaho Code Section 42-1102 expressly 
, 
grants the Brattons a reasonable width of land for the continued operation and maintenance of 
the irrigation ditch that the parties all agree: (1) belonged to the Brattons; and (2) was 
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constructed to serve the Brattons' parcel. The Brattons are not seeking to increase any burden 
upon the servient estate. The Scotts' property has been "burdened" by the use of a l2-foot 
irrigation easement and right-of-way since 1973. That "burden" was accepted and 
acknowledged by the Scotts' predecessors-in-interest, including the unified parcel owner, 
Mr. Ford, who conveyed the easement to the Brattons in 1973. The Brattons are simply seeking 
to maintain the status quo, a status quo that the Scotts had no right to obliterate. See IDAHO 
CODE § 42-1102; Nampa & Meridian Irrigation Dist. v. Wash. Fed. Sav., 135 Idaho 518 (2001); 
IDAHO CODE § 42-1207; and Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at Ex. C (wherein 
the Gift Deed that conveyed the subject property to the Scotts expressly provided that the Scotts 
were taking ownership of the property "subject to any encumbrances or easements as appear of 
record or by use upon such property." (emphasis added)). 
e. New title re: common law implied easement. 
Even ifthe trial court required that the Brattons prove common law implied easement, 
inclement weather delayed placement of the ditch until after the conveyance ofthe dominant 
property. There is ample authority in Idaho to allow that under that set of facts, the easement 
was implied by prior use. Phillips Industries, Inc. v. Firkins, 121 Idaho 693, 699, 827 P.2d 706, 
711 (Ct. App. 1992), states that apparent continuous use is not required prior to the separation of 
the estates. See also Davis v. Gowen, 83 Idaho 204, 210, 360 P.2d 403,407 (1961). 
Again, even ifthe trial court disregarded the evidence that a 12-foot easement was 
conveyed in 1973, the Brattons proved that the easement was "intended to be permanent." 
Thomas v. Madsen, 142 Idaho 635, 658, 132 P.3d 392, 395 (2006). Accordingly, the creation of 
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an implied easement may be inferred "through the presumed intent of the parties based upon the 
circumstances of separation ofland formerly under one ownership ... or inferred often 
fictitiously through long continued use of the easement." Schultz v. Atkins, 97 Idaho 770, 773, 
554P.2d 948, 952 (1976) (citing THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 351 (1961». 
Necessity is also an element of an implied easement by prior use. However, the necessity 
is "reasonable necessity" rather than "great present necessity." Id. at 773. Therefore, the 
Brattons need only show that the easement by prior use was reasonably necessary at the time of 
severance. Davis v. Peacock, 133 Idaho 637, 643, 991 P.2d 362 (1999) (emphasis added). 
Even the location of an express easement depends upon the intention of the parties and 
the circumstances at the time the easement was given, and then carried out. Bedke v. Pickett 
Ranch & Sheep Co., 143 Idaho 36, 39, 137 P.3d 423, 426 (2006). When the parties take 
affirmative. steps to place appurtenances on the easement at the time it is granted or reserved, 
their actions in so doing constitute an expression of their intent with respect to the scope and 
location of that easement. See Bedke, 143 Idaho at 39; Hughes v. Fisher, 142 Idaho 474, 129 
P.3d 1223 (2006). Here, Ford testified that he granted a permanent 12-foot easement. The trial 
evidence showed that the full 12-foot easement was continuously used for a period of no less 
than thirty-four (34) years, that use of the full 12 feet was reasonably necessary in order to allow 
use and maintenance ofthe irrigation ditch easement, and that appurtenances were placed 
(galvanized and cement pipe). 
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f. Excluding Idaho Code Section 42-1102 was error. 
The trial court omitted Idaho Code Section 42-1102 from the jury instructions on the 
grounds that Idaho Code Section 42-1207 contained the necessary rule of law. Not all of the 
germane concepts set forth within Idaho Code Section 42-1102 are incorporated into Idaho Code 
Section 42-1207. While both Idaho Code Sections 42-1102 and 42-1207 address the rights and 
obligations of ditch owners and servient landowners, only Idaho Code Section 42-1102 
specifical1y addresses the creation, nature, and scope ofthe irrigation easements and rights-of-
way underlying irrigation ditches. 
The statutes found within Chapters 11 and 12 of Title 42, Idaho Code, are not mutual1y 
exclusive. Instead, the statutes build upon one another. The fact that statutes are to be read in 
pari mat(!ria is a wel1-settled canon of statutory construction. &(!, e.g., State v. Yager, 139 Idaho 
680, 690 (2004). Unfortunately, the trial court ignored this fundamental concept by 
impermissibly reading these statutes in a vacuum. Consequently, the trial court's barring of the 
application of Idaho Code Section 42-1102 to the consideration of this matter unfairly prejudiced 
the Brattons. It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that statutes that are in pari 
materia are to be construed together, to the end that the legislative intent wil1 be given effect. 
For example, Idaho Code Sections 42-1204 and 42-1207 speak only in terms of the 
existing irrigation easement or right-of way, the protection of that easement and right-of-way, 
and the corresponding facility which the underlying easement and right-of way serves. Those 
statutes do not speak in terms of the initial creation and necessity of the underlying irrigation 
easement and right-of-way. Idaho Code Section 42-1102 not only contemplates the operation 
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and maintenance needs for an irrigation easement and right-of-way, but also sets out the reasons 
for which the easement and right-of-way were created; i.e., the requisite irrigation easement and 
right-of way is created in order to assist those landowners in conveying their water rights to their 
landlocked properties. This is a factual element which was central to the consideration of this 
case. Idaho Code Section 42-1102 sets forth the reason why the Brattons need an irrigation 
easement and right-of-way, and said statute (in conjunction with Idaho Code Section 42-1207) 
,sets forth what rights the Brattons possess in relation to any servient landowners (the Scotts, in 
this case). 
Additionally, another key componentto this case, and a concept that is only provided for 
in Idaho Code Section 42-1102, is the ''notice concept"-the fact that the mere existence of an 
open and visible ditch and/or corresponding irrigation infrastructure located on the surface ofthe 
ground put the Scotts on notice that the ditch possesses a corresponding irrigation easement and 
right-of-way across the Scotts' property. Idaho Code Section 42-1102's visibility component 
sets forth the notice that there is an "essential" right ofthe dominant estate to operate and 
maintain the irrigation ditch, and that the Scotts were not permitted to interfere with the use and 
enjoyment of that dominant estate irrigation easement and right-of-way. See IDAHO CODE 
§§ 42-1102 and 42-1207. In this matter, the Scotts admitted that before they interfered with the 
easement and destroyed the ditch, they affirmatively knew that the irrigation ditch existed, and 
that the ditch was maintained and used by the Brattons to irrigate their property. Thus, the 
Scotts' actions in interfering with the Brattons' use of their irrigation easement, and the Scotts' 
obliteration of the Brattons' irrigation ditch absent the Brattons' prior written permission, 
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violated the plain and unambiguous tenns ofIdaho Code Sections 42-1102 and 42-1207, among 
others. As discussed herein, the trial court inexplicably erred in excluding the proper 
consideration of both statutes in this matter. 
g. Implied easement by operation of law. 
The facts regarding the ditch and easement's prior use are not in dispute. Idaho law 
recognizes that implied easements may be created by prior use. See Davis v. Peacock, 133 Idaho 
637,643,991 P.2d 362,368 (1999); Phillips Indus., Inc. v. Firkins, 121 Idaho 693, 699, 827 
P.2d 706,711 (Idaho Ct. App. 1992). Idaho recognizes two distinct methods for establishing an 
implied easement. The first is set forth in Davis, 133 Idaho at 643, 991 P.2d at 368, which 
reqUIres: 
(1) unity of title or ownership and subsequent separation by grant of the dominant 
estate; (2) apparent continuous use long enough before separation of the dominant 
estate to show that the use was intended to be pennanent; and (3) the easement 
must be reasonably necessary to the proper enjoyment ofthe dominant estate. 
!d. at 642, 991 P.2d at 367. The second method was first promulgated in Davis v. Gowen, 83 
Idaho 204, 360 P.2d 403 (1961), and requires: 
(1) unity oftitle or ownership and subsequent separation by grant of the dominant 
estate; (2) apparent continuous user; [and] (3) the easement must be reasonably 
necessary to the proper enjoyment ofthe dominant estate. 
Id. at 210,991 P.2d at 407 (emphasis added). The Davis v. Gowen method was favorably cited 
in Davis v. Peacock and remains valid authority today. See Close v. Rensink, 95 Idaho 72, 501 
P.2d 1383 (1972); Phillips Indus., Inc. v. Firkins, 121 Idaho 693, 699, 827 P.2d 706,711 (Ct. 
App. 1992). In fact, several courts have recognized the validity of the Gowen language in 
detennining the existence of an implied easement. Id. In Close, the Idaho Supreme Court stated: 
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"[ eJven though the phraseology of the requirements as set out in Davis v. Gowen, ... is 
somewhat different ... the same principles are involved." Close, 95 Idaho at 76, 501 P.2d at 
1387 (emphasis added). See also Shultz v. Atkins, 97 Idaho 770, 554 P.2d 948 (1976). 
As this Court has made clear, it is the second prong of the Davis v. Peacock holding: I.e., 
(2) apparent continuous use long enough before separation of the dominant estate to show 
that the use was intended to be permanent, that has caused the Court to question the basis of . 
implied easement. Under the Davis v. Gowen method of determining an implied easement, the 
Brattons have continuously used the ditch and associated easement since 1973. 
Further, it is iJ;nportant to note one difference between an implied easemen,t for irrigation 
systems and those for other reasons. In Abbott v. Nampa School District No. 131,119 Idaho 544, 
808 P.2d 1289 (1991), the Court recognized that a ditch easement necessarily includes the 
applicable state law, such as the explicit requirement for a ditch owner to maintain .and clean 
their ditch and ditch embankments. As such, when considering an irrigation easement, as here, 
regard for applicable statutory provisions must be given. Conversely, in Peacock, the case 
revolves around a road easement, not an irrigation system. The reason that the distinction is so 
important is because there are specific statutory protections for irrigation systems, which statutes 
do not apply to other easements. Due to the protective statutes for irrigation systems, the 
Brattons demonstrated a valid implied easement or right-of-way by operation of law. 
h. The Scotts had written and actnal notice. 
Additionally, the Scotts' Gift Deed must be considered. Idaho law has created a statutory 
implied easement where a purchaser ofland has notice of a ditch: 
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The existence of a visible ditch, canal or conduit shall constitute notice to the 
owner, or any subsequent purchaser, of the underlying servient estate, that the 
owner ofthe ditch, canal or conduit has the right-of-way and incidental rights 
confirmed or granted by this section. 
IDAHO CODE § 42-1102. 
In 2005, when the Gift Deed conveyed the property to the Scotts, the facts are 
uncontested that the ditch was in plain sight, open, and in obvious use. In fact, prior to 2007, 
John Scott watched Mr. Bratton irrigate and use the ditch. In 2007 the Scotts: (I) threatened 
Mr. Bratton while he was cleaning and maintaining his ditch; (2) placed No Trespassing signs; 
(3) continued to threaten Mr. Bratton when he tried to irrigate; (4) destroyed the ditch; and then 
(5) placed yellow rope containing the "No Trespassing" signs. Mr. Bratton asked the Scotts to 
replace the ditch in its original location and configuration. The Scotts refused. Only then did the 
Brattons seek judicial intervention. 
Pursuant to Idaho Code Section 42-1102, where a subsequent purchaser of the servient 
estate can visibly identifY the ditch, the visible nature of the ditch is sufficient notice to inform 
the purchaser of the easement. In this case, prior to 2007, the Scotts admitted the ditch was 
visible and that the Brattons had been using the ditch for irrigation for that same period. Based 
on the visible nature of the ditch and their knowledge that the Brattons used the ditch for 
irrigation, the Scotts had been on notice ofthe ditch and all incidental rights associated therewith 
as set forth by the statutes preViously discussed herein. 
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The Scotts' Gift Deed further confinns the existence ofthe implied easement. As 
mentioned, the deed contains the following language infonning the Scotts that their property was 
subjected to certain encumbrances and easements: 
The following described premises, to-wit: 
together with all tenements, hereditaments, water, water rights, ditches, ditch 
rights, easements and appurtenances thereunto belonging or in anywise 
appertaining, and subject to any encumbrances or easements as appear of record 
or by use upon such property. 
(Emphasis added). PI. Trial Ex. 9. Tr. Vol. II, P. 462, L. 20 - p. 464, L. 1. TheScotts had 
notice ofthe existing ditch and easement by way of its visible nature and use, which is buttressed 
by the language contained within their Gift Deed. 
i. The court misapplied Idaho Code Section 42-1207 in awarding 
aJNOV. 
The trial court found that the Brattons are not entitled to any award of damages, 
particularly under Idaho Code Section 42-1207, unless the Brattons sufficiently proved that the 
Scotts' actions impeded the flow of water. The trial court's ruling is against the plain language 
of the state water statute, which provides in part that the impedance of flow of water in a ditch is 
not the only measure of damages, but that damages may also result if the tortfeaser changes the 
dominant estate's ditch. See IDAHO CODE § 42-1207. 
Idaho Code Section 42-1207 acknowledges and protects separate and distinct rights: 
(1) the conveyance of one's own individual water rights, and (2) a separate property interest in 
the integrity of the irrigation facility and its overall flows beyond one's own, individual water 
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right (known as a "ditch right"). See Savage Ditch Water Users v. Pulley, 125 Idaho 237, 242-43 
(1993) ("It is undeniable that water and ditch rights are tied together in that the ditch carries the 
water. But they are not the same."); see also Simonson v. Moon, 72 Idaho 39, 47 (1951) ("[I]n 
this state a ditch right for the conveyance of water is recognized as a property right apart from 
and independent of the right to the use of water conveyed therein. Each may be owned, held and 
conveyed independently of the other."). Consequently, one can have an injury to his or her water 
rights (through impeded ditch flows), but one can also sustain a distinctly separate injury to their 
ditch rights as a result of a change in the ditch or irrigation facility. This is why Idaho Code 
Section 42-1207 contains the disjunctive "or" (" ... as not to impede the flow of water therein 
OR to otherwise injure any person or persons using or interested in such ditch ... "), and why the 
statute requires the prior written permission of the ditch owner before a servient landowner may 
alter a ditch or place the same in a pipe. The location and integrity of an irrigation ditch itself is 
protected by this prior written permission requirement. 
Idaho Code Section 42-1207 operates to protect not only the conveyance of water, but 
also operates to protect one's property interest in the location, configuration, and integrity ofthe 
existing irrigation ditch. See Savage Ditch Water Users and Simonson, supra. This is why the 
Savage court made the observation that while specific ditch flow (i.e., flow impedance) evidence 
would be "vital in a water rights controversy," such evidence was not the only acceptable 
evidence to establish a legally cognizable injury (injury to one's ditch rights) under the statute. 
[d. at 243. According to the Savage court, other forms of injury contemplated under the statute 
included increased maintenance difficulty, forced use rotation, and other "inconvenience." [d. 
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This case does not present a "water rights controversy," but does present a ditch right 
controversy. The Brattons were not required to present evidence of impeded water flow to 
prosecute their well settled ditch right. Likewise, the jury did not have to find that the Scotts' 
interference with the Brattons' irrigation ditch resulted in impeded water flow in order to award 
the Brattons damages as compensation for the Brattons' separate and distinct ditch rights. Under 
Idaho Code Section 42-1207, the Brattons could be harmed either by an impedance in ditch 
flows·OR "otherwise injured" by the Scotts' unlawful interference with their ditch rights-rights 
capable of being "owned, held and conveyed independently" of their underlying water rights. 
See Savage Ditch Water Users' and Simonson, supra. 
4. Damages resulted when Scots did not ohtain permission. 
In addition to the fact that impedance of water flow is not the sole measure of injury or 
damage under Idaho Code Section 42-1207, the jury was also equally entitled to award damages 
against the Scotts for their failure to secure the Brattons' written permission prior to changing the 
Brattons' irrigation ditch. The Scotts' unilateral actions amounted to negligence per se, given the 
terms ofIdaho Code Section 42-1207, "must be fully complied with by one seeking to exercise 
the right it confers." Simonson, 72 Idaho at 45; see also Savage Ditch Water Users, 125 Idaho at 
242-43. As a result, the evidentiary burden under Idaho Code Section 42-1207 fell to the Scotts 
and not the Brattons. It was the Scotts who were required to prove that they had the Brattons' 
prior written permission to destroy the Brattons' irrigation ditch. Put simply, the Scotts violated 
the plain terms ofIdaho Code Section 42-1207, and the jury found it appropriate to award 
general damages against the Scotts for that intentional and blatant violation. 
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5. The propriety of the jury verdict. 
It is well established in Idaho that the trial court should not disturb a verdict unless, as a 
matter oflaw, no recovery can be made upon any view .. ,. Iverson Paints, Inc. v. Wirth Corp., 
94 Idaho 43, 480 P.2d 889 (1971) (emphasis added). In ruling on a motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict, the trial court may not weigh the evidence or resolve the conflict 
therein or determine what conclusion should have been drawn therefrom. . . . Koser v. 
Hornback, 75 Idaho 24,27,265 P.2d 988, 989 (1954); Ness v. W Coast, Inc., 90 Idaho 111 
(1965). The jury had a first-hand opportunity to view the evidence as set forth in Smith v. Big 
Lost River: 
The members ofthe jury having had the opportunity to see all the witnesses, 
observe the manner of their testimony, note their apparent candor and knowledge 
of the matter concerning which they were examined, were entitled to give such 
weight to the evidence introduced as in their judgment was proper. 
Smith at 392. 
In Idaho, the jury may base its opinion on minimal evidence and matters of common 
experience if the evidence and experience is sufficient to allow for this verdict. Fouche v. 
Chrysler Motors Corp., 107Idaho 701, 692 P.2d 345 (1984). Therefore, in Idaho, jurors have 
the right to apply their own common experience in rendering their verdict. The Idaho Supreme 
Court is firmly committed to the rule that a trial court should not take a case from the jury unless, 
as a matter oflaw, no recovery can be made upon any view ... Iverson Paints, Inc. v. Wirth 
Corp., 94 Idaho 43, 480 P.2d 889 (1971). 
Any and all damages flowing from that "harm" can reasonably be considered general 
damages for which there is no neat quantitative formula for the jury to apply. See Shrum, 
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Gonzales, and Bentzinger, supra. In viewing the evidence most favorable to the Brattons, the 
jury's award of $4,250.00 as damages for the Scotts' failure to comply with the express language 
ofIdaho Code Section 42-1207, was reasonable based on the evidence allowed by the trial court, 
collective knowledge, and experience of the jury. The $2,250.00 ditch restoration-related 
damage award was based on the evidence allowed by the trial court well within the purview and 
general life experience (i.e., common knowledge) ofthis Canyon County, Idaho, jury. See 
Quick, Smith, and Espinoza, supra. During voir dire, many members of the jury had actual 
experience with digging ditches, maintaining ditches, easements, irrigation, and the operation of 
large equipment. 
It is common knowledge that Canyon County, Idaho, remains largely agricultural and 
pastoral. As a result, many ofthe jurors had extensive first-hand knowledge of flood irrigation 
practices, surface water delivery facilities, and pastures. See Quick, Smith, and Espinoza, supra. 
Because jurors bring with them their general life experiences, and a corresponding sense of what 
is and is not reasonable in light ofthose life experiences, they are qualified to estimate the costs 
of restoring an irrigation ditch. 
Given the allowed evidence on damages, the damage awards were reasonable, not 
nominal, and were not of such amount to shock the consciousness. In fact, the jury awards in 
this case were conservative and well within the confines ofthe allowed evidence, and based on 
the jury's collective knowledge and experience. 
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C. The Trial Court Erred by Not Awarding the Brattous a New Trial. 
1. Legal standard. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a) states: 
A new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the 
issues in an action for any ofthe following reasons: 
1. Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury, or adverse 
party or any order of the court or abuse of discretion by which 
either party was prevented from having a fair trial. 
* * * 
7. Error in law, occurring at the trial. 
* * * 
(Emphasis added.) A trial court may grant a new trial even though there is substantial evidence 
to support the jury's verdict. Gillingham Constr., Inc. v. Newby-Wiggens Constr., Inc., 142 
Idaho 15,23,121 P.3d 946, 954 (2005) (citing Bott v. Idaho State Bldg. Auth., 122 Idaho 471, 
475,835 P.2d 1282, 1286 (1992». As discussed more fully below, the Brattons are entitled to a 
new trial pursuant to 59(a)(I), "Irregularity in the proceedings of the court," and 59(a)(7) "Error 
in law, occurring at the trial." 
2. Irregularity of the proceedings. 
Rule 59(a)(I) allows in part for a new trial ifit is found that there were irregularities of 
the proceeding of the Court, "[o]r any order of the Court or abuse of discretion by which the 
party was prevented from having a fair trial." This trial court conducted the trial in such a 
mauner as to cause great hardship for the Brattons, including, but not limited to: entering 
burdensome evidentiary rulings; excluding substantial relevant evidence; advising the Brattons 
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and their counsel continually from the pretrial throughout the trial that ifthey did not prevail, the 
trial court would grant attorney fees to the Scotts; refusing to recognize and apply the applicable 
statutes; trifurcating the trial, which caused an enormous cost to the Brattons; making confusing 
and untimely rulings on the admission of evidence, which made it very difficult to put on each of . 
the three segments' prima facie evidence; causing significant confusion as to the evidence 
allowed in each prima facie element; and causing confusion on the part of the jury. 
When evaluating whether a trial court correctly ruled on the new trial based on 
irregnlarity in the proceedings merits, this Court reviews whether or not the district court took 
into consideration whether the irregnlarity had any effect on the jury's decision and, if so, 
whether the effect allowed for a new trial. Gillingham, 142 Idaho at 23, 121 P.3d at 954. 
Furthermore, when a jury is improperly instructed, and the effect of the improper instruction has 
the cumulative effect of causing the jury to reach a conclusion that is not justified, the only 
conch/sion which may be drawn is that a fair and impartial trial was not had. See Griffith v. 
Schmidt, 110 Idaho 235, 237-38, 715 P.2d 905, 907-08 (1986). 
3. Trifurcation. 
This trifurcation ruling came asa complete surprise to the Brattons. Although the Scotts 
moved for bifurcation, the trial court went beyond the Scotts' motion and, sua sponte, trifurcated 
the trial, an order which the trial court admitted was unprecedented and was partially based on 
the fact that the Court did not think that the Brattons would be able to make a prima facie case 
for liability (second segment), and then the damage section (third segment) would not be 
necessary. Further, as to the first segment, even though the trial court had ruled that the 
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equitable portion of the Brattons' Complaint was now moot, the trial court empanelled an 
advisory jury regarding the equitable relief, but only as to whether there existed an implied 
easement under the element in Madsen. Segment number two would be liability and, if needed, 
segment number three would be damages. The trifurcation order made it overly burdensome and 
sent the Brattons' counsel on the eve of trial back to work to fully reorganize their case. 
The trial court's basis for trifurcation was to save time; in reality, it more than doubled 
the trial time, was confusing to the jury, and in violation of judicial premise of orderly and 
efficient litigation. An example of confusion came during the trial when the trial court stopped 
the Brattons' counsel during a witness examination to ask the jury to vote by a raise of hands 
whether the offered testimony had already been heard in the first segment. This was the first 
time that the Brattons' counsel was directed by the trial court that evidence in each segment 
could be used in subsequent segments. After the hand vote by the jury, Brattons' counsel was 
directed by the trial court to move to another subject. 
4. The trial court's Jury Instructiou No.8 was in error. 
The Brattons had received a partial summary judgment of their express easement, and the 
trial court had taken judicial notice ofIdaho Code Sections 42-1102, 42-1204, and 42-1207. 
Idaho Code Section 42- 1102 allowed for an implied easement by operation oflaw, but the trial 
court refused to apply Idaho Code Section 42-1102 and held that this statute applied only if the 
easement was based on riparian rights and was trumped by case law. 
The trial court based this ruling on case law cited by the Scotts; i.e., Thomas v. Madsen, 
142 Idaho 635, 132 P.3d 392. The trial court ruled that Thomas v. Madsen stood for the premise 
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that the Brattons must prove the elements of Madsen on implied easement, even though they had 
an express irrigation easement and the rights afforded by Idaho Code Section 42-1102. The 
Thomas v. Madsen case did not deal with irrigation or Idaho Code Section 42-1102, but rather 
dealt with a driveway dispute. The Brattons argued that Madsen did not preempt application of 
Idaho Code Section 42-1102, but rather was inapplicable because of the express irrigation 
easement and the State ofIdaho irrigation statutes. Based on the trial court rulings regarding the 
inapplicability of Idaho Code Section 42-1102, the jury's instruction No.8 is the correct law of 
the state ofIdaho: 
INSTRUCTION NO.8 
Plaintiffs claim that they have an implied easement over Defendants' property 
based upon prior use. In order to establish an implied easement by prior use, 
Plaintiffs must prove the following three elements: 
(1) Unity oftitle or ownership and subsequent separation by grant of 
the dominant estate; 
(2) Apparent continuous use long enough before conveyance of the 
dominant estate to show that the use was intended to be permanent; and 
(3) That the easement is reasonably necessary to the proper enjoyment 
ofthe dominant estate. 
Of note, the same jury deciding segment one would be the jury that would decide the 
remaining two segments. Because the jury was to take each segment and all of the jury 
instructions into consideration when deciding all subsequent segments, the improper instructions 
in the first segment impacted the view of the state of the law for the jury in all of the segments. 
The Idaho appellate courts have long held that the giving of an incorrect instruction 
constitutes "such irregularity and error in law as to bring the case within Rule 59(a)." Walton v. 
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Potlatch Corp., 116 Idaho 892, 897, 781 P.2d 229, 234 (1989). In fact, when a jury verdict is 
. rendered "on the basis of incorrect instructions, the appropriate remedy is the granting of a new 
trial." Walton, 116 Idaho at 234. See also, Corey v. Wilson, 93 Idaho 54, 454 P.2d 951 (1969); 
Walker v. Distler, 78 Idaho 38, 296 P.2d 452 (1956). Finally, the Supreme Court ofIdaho held 
some 30 years ago that "[t]he trial court is under a duty to instruct the jury on every reasonable 
theory recognized by law that is supported at trial." Everton v. Blair, 99 Idaho 14,576 P.2d 585 
(1978)(citing Hodge v. Borden, 91 Idaho 125,417 P.2d 75 (1966); Domingo v. Phillips, 87 
Idaho 55, 390 P.2d 297 (1964); Wurm v. Pulice, 82 Idaho 359, 353 P.2d 1071 (1960». In fact, 
the trial court "has a duty to grant a new trial where prejudicial errors oflaw have occurred at the 
trial, even though the verdict ofthe jury is supported by substantial evidence." Sherwood v. 
Carter, 119 Idaho 246, 262, 805 P.2d 452, 468 (1991) (citing Mann v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 95 
Idaho 732, 518 P.2d 1194 (1974». 
Instructing on Idaho Code Section 42-1102 was fundamental to the Brattons' lawsuit, and 
instructing the jury with an incorrect statement of the law was a requirement that the Brattons 
could not overcome. This irregularity of the trial court permanently and unfairly led the jury to 
decide the full matter using an incorrect instruction on the law of irrigation easements. 
5. Impediment of flow is not required for damage award. 
The law clearly states that the Brattons could suffer harm or injury by a "change of the 
ditch Q!: impediment of flow." See IDAHO CODE § 42-1207 (emphasis added). The Brattons met 
the burden that the Scotts changed the ditch. The trial court nevertheless disagreed with the 
express language ofIdaho Code Section 42-1207, and refused to recognize the word "or" in the 
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statute. Instead, the trial court ruled that both elements were required and thus gave an 
instruction that required the jury to answer a separate question as to whether there was 
impediment of flow. The trial court then utilized that specific special verdict question regarding 
impediment of flow to deny most of the Brattons' damage evidence. This action by the court 
was an abuse of discretion and was instrumental in preventing a fair trial. 
As noted above, when a verdict is rendered on the basis ofincorrect instructions, the 
appropriate remedy is the granting of a new trial. See Walton, supra. Furthermore, because of 
the replication ofthe fundamental error in the court's jury instruction, there was a "cumulative 
effect" that certainly caused the jury to reach an unjustified conclusion. As such, "a fair and 
impartial trial was not had." Griffith, 110 Idaho at 238. 
6. Trial conrt's warning on attorney fees. 
The trial court, both on the record, in chambers, and offthe record, warned the Brattons 
and their attorneys that if they did not prevail or if the award was nominal, then the trial court 
would award attorney fees to the Scotts. The trial court did not cite the basis of allowing for 
fees. This case was not an attorney fee matter in that there is no statutory basis for fees, and the 
case certainly was not brought on a frivolous basis. The trial court abused its discretion by 
continually warning that it would award attorney fees against the Brattons if they did not prevail 
or if the damages were decided by the trial court to be nominal. 
7. Exclusion of plaintiffs evidence. 
Based on the trial court's misinterpretation of the law with respect to irrigation 
easements, it excluded and limited a substantial portion of the Brattons' damages. The list of 
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exclusions set forth below is not meant to be a complete list, but is set forth to show the 
substantial nature ofthe Brattons' evidence that the trial court ruled inadmissible. 
a. Evidence was excluded of crop loss and consequences. 
Because the trial court misinterpreted the Idaho statutes on easements, specifically Idaho 
Code Section 42-1207, the trial court ruled that crop loss and consequences thereof would be 
excluded and based that ruling on the fact that the jury found no impediment of flow. Again, the 
Brattons argued that the statute, Idaho Code Section 42-1207, allowed for harm, without 
limitation, to the Brattons if there was impediment of flow OR if the ditch was changed. 
The trial court would not allow a special verdict question on whether the Scotts destroyed 
the Brattons' ditch, but rather would only allow the question of whether the Scotts changed the 
ditch. The jury found that the Scotts had violated the law by changing the ditch without written 
permission and that the change caused interference and that interference caused harm to the 
Brattons. Following the trial court's ruling excluding substantial crop loss damage, the Brattons 
made an offer of proof to include evidence of expert testimony, actual loss, and actual 
consequences ofthe injury proximately caused by the Scotts' actions. The crop loss and 
consequence thereto was the Brattons' largest element of damage, and by excluding all evidence 
pertaining thereto, the trial court in effect denied the Brattons their right to a fair and impartial 
jury trial. The trial court based all rulings on a misinterpretation of the statutory law regarding 
easements/right-of-ways, and that misapplication caused numerous errors. Since the trial court 
would not recognize that Idaho Code Section 42-1102 was controlling in this matter, and since 
the trial court found that Idaho Code Sections 42-1204 and 1207 only allowed damage to the 
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claimants' estate if flow was impeded, the judge's ruling on exclusion of damages was 
fundamentally flawed. The trial court clearly abused its discretion in the above-listed rulings 
against the Brattons. 
h. Evidence was excluded on replacement of tiled ditch. 
The trial court clearly and uufairly restricted the Brattons as to their damage evidence. 
First, based on the interpretation ofIdaho Code Section 42-1207, in which the trial court ruled 
that impediment of flow was required to allow damages of anything other than replacing an 
aboveground ditch, the trial court .excluded all ofthe Brattons' evidence as to the cost of 
replacing the tiled ditch. The whole case had been pled, discovered, and depositions had been 
taken with the premise that the Brattons were seeking damages to install an uudergrouud system. 
The trial court ruled that this evidence was excluded. 
D. Jndgment for Costs, Discretionary Costs, and Attorney Fees. 
The Scotts did not meet the requirements of the cited statutes and rules in their motion for 
costs, disbursements, and attorney fees and, therefore, the trial court erred in awarding such costs 
and fees. 
1. The Scotts are not the prevailing party. 
In the case on review, the Scotts' award of JNOV did not disturb the uuanimous special 
verdict questions in favor of the Brattons on liability (second segment). Under Idaho Rule of 
Civil Procedure 54, costs as a matter of right may be awarded to the "prevailing party." Initially, 
it is important to note that legal proceedings often fail to yield a wholly prevailing party, and 
there should be no award if the court determines that neither side prevailed. Owner-Operator 
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Indep. Drivers Ass 'n v. Idaho Pub. Uti!. Comm 'n, 125 Idaho 401, 407 (1984). Similarly, ifboth 
parties have prevailed in part, the court may exercise its discretion to decline the award of costs 
to either party. Burnham v. Bray, 104 Idaho 550,554-55 (Ct. App. 1983) (emphasis added). For 
its part, Rule 54 provides: 
In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party and entitled to costs, 
the trial court shall in its sound discretion consider the final judgment or result of 
the action in relation to relief sought by the respective parties. The trial court in 
its sound discretion may determine that a party to an action prevailed in part and 
did not prevail in part, and upon so finding may apportion the costs between and 
among the parties in a fair and equitable manner after considering all ofthe issues 
and claims involved in the action and the resultant judgment or judgments 
obtained. (Emphasis added.) 
LR.C.P.54(d)(1)(B). 
A determination that a party has prevailed "is a matter committed to the sound discretion 
ofthe trial court." J.R. Simplot Co. v. Chemetics Int'l, Inc., 130 Idaho 255 (1997). However, the 
court of appeals has laid out a three-part inquiry to aid the trial court in its determination of the 
prevailing party: "The court must examine (1) the result obtained in relation to the relief sought; 
(2) whether there were multiple claims or issues; and (3) the extent to which either party 
prevailed on each issue or claim." Jerry J. Joseph C.L. u., Ins. Assocs., Inc. v. Vaught, 117 
Idaho 555, 557 (Ct. App. 1990) (emphasis added). See Chenery v. Agri-Lines Corp., 106 Idaho 
687,692 (Ct. App. 1984) (dismissal ofa claim and when dismissal occurred were two of many 
factors considered in making a prevailing party determination). 
Although the trial court has the discretion to find that a party "prevailed in part and did 
not prevail in part," it is also clear that the court is not "compelled to make a discrete award of 
41 Client:1500924.1 
costs on each claim." Id. at 693. Instead, applicable precedent instructs ''the total defense of a 
party's proceedings must be unreasonable or frivolous." Magic Valley v. Prof,! Bus. Servs., 119 
Idaho 558, 563 (1991) (emphasis added). See also Seiniger Law Office, P.A. v. N. Pac. Ins. Co., 
145 Idaho 241,178 P.3d 606 (2008) ("I.e. § 12-121 applies to the case as a whole. Where there 
are multiple claims and defenses, it is not appropriate to segregate those claims and defenses for 
purposes of awarding costs and fees under I.C. § 12-121.") (internal citations omitted). There 
was no overall prevailing party in the matter. See Int'l Eng 'g Co. v. Daum Indus. Inc., 102 Idaho 
363, 367 (1984) (even where plaintiff prevailed on several counts and defendant prevailed on 
only one issue, this Court did not disturb the trial court's determination that there was not a 
prevailing party). Given that this litigation was not "entirely favorable" to the Scotts, the Scotts 
are not the prevailing party and should not be awarded their claimed costs, and certainly not their 
discretionary costs and attorney fees. At most, the trial court can only find that the Scotts 
"prevailed in part and did not prevail in part." IDAHO R. CIV. P. 54(d)(1)(B) Even if the trial 
court did so find that both parties prevailed in part, the results of the verdict were mixed, and an 
award of costs, discretionary costs, and attorney fees to the Scotts is not appropriate. 
2. Plaintiffs' action was not frivolous or without foundation. 
As to attorney fees, Idaho courts follow the American Rule on the question of awards of 
attorney fees, which provides that "attorney fees are to be awarded only where they are 
authorized by statute or contract." Hellar v. Cenarrusa, 106 Idaho 571 (1984). Consequently, a 
party must provide legal authority supporting a fee request. MDS Invs., L.L. C. v. State, 138 
Idaho 456 (2003). Rule 54 ofthe Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Idaho Code Sections 10-1210, 
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12-120, and 12-121 do not support the claim since the case was not brought frivolously, is not 
the subject of a commercial transaction, and there was never a hearing afforded by the trial court 
or given to Brattons' claim of equitable relief. 
Under Idaho Code Section 12-121, the Scotts may only recover their attorney fees if the 
trial court determined that the Brattons' action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without 
foundation. Even if the trial court was persuaded that the Scotts were the prevailing party, 
Rule 54(e)(l) lirnitsthe award of attorney fees to a prevailing party pursuant to Idaho Code 
Section 12-121 to circumstances where "the case was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, 
unreasonably or without foundation." I.R.C.P. 54(e)(I); Seiniger, 145 Idaho at 215, 178 P.3d at 
616 (2008). In making such a determination, "[ t ]he sole question is whether the losing party's 
position is so plainly fallacious as to be deemed frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation." 
Severson v. Hermann, 116 Idaho 497, 498 (1989). Even though the trial court is afforded broad 
discretion, it must make a "specific finding ... supported by the record." ld. See also Black v. 
Young, 122 Idaho 302, 310 (1992) (acknowledging discretion of the court to make an award, but 
noting that an award is improper ''where the record itself discloses" the reasonableness of a claim 
or defense); J.MF. Trucking v. Carburetor & Elec. of Lewiston, 113 Idaho 797, 799 (1987) 
(overturning trial court's award offees as arbitrary and inconsistent because it denied a motion to 
dismiss a claim because of reasonable factual conflicts on the record and subsequently granted 
attorney fees on grounds that the same claim was frivolously or unreasonably pursued). In this 
case, the record very clearly discloses that the Brattons' case was necessary and reasonable; it 
was not brought frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation. Further, the Brattons 
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prevailed as to liability, which unanimous verdict remained undisturbed by the trial court's grant 
of Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict to Defendants. 
3. Brattons' claim was based on Idaho statutes. 
In light of the fact that the Brattons presented a statutory basis for their Complaint, and 
the fact that the trial court had to resort to the canons of statutory construction to resolve the 
applicability of the statute, the Brattons' Complaint did not justify an award of attorney fees to 
the Scotts. Although the trial court is afforded broad discretion to award attorneys fees, it was 
reversible error to do so in these circumstances. The record clearly indicates that the Brattons 
reasonably pursued this complaint, which was well founded and based on the statutes of the state 
of Idaho. The record shows that the jury found unanimously in favor of the Brattons as to 
liability and injury. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Based on the facts presented at trial and the clear statutory law controlling long-standing 
irrigation ditches, easements, and rights-of-way, Appellants respectfully request that the 
judgment n.o.v. and that the costs and fees awarded to the Scotts be vacated and that the Motion 
for New Trial be granted. 
DATED this /u..J<-. day of February, 2010. 
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